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COMMENTS 
EVIDENCE-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STANDING TO SUPPRESS EVI-
DENCE OBTAINED BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
Jn 1955 the Supreme Court of California, in the case of People v. 
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Cahan,1 discarded the common law rule which permitted the use 
in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained by unreasonable 
search and seizure. By this ruling California acceded to the prop-
osition, now accepted by nearly a majority of the states and by 
the federal courts,2 that the only effective way to enforce a constitu-
tional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure3 is to 
prohibit the use of evidence obtained by such means. Earlier, 
California had expressly rejected the exclusionary principle 
adopted by the federal courts, 4 but the traditional common law 
remedies for unreasonable search and seizure proved inadequate 
to wholly prevent law enforcement officers from employing repre-
hensible means in the search for evidence.6 
Since its rejection of the common law rule the California court 
has handed down a number of decisions which make it plain that 
California now goes much farther than the federal courts or any 
of the other states in excluding evidence obtained by unreasonable 
search and seizure. Under the federal rule, for example, a defend-
ant must move before trial to suppress illegal evidence.6 In Cal-
ifornia this limitation is not observed.7 Under the federal rule, 
evidence obtained by searching the person of one lawfully arrested 
144 Cal. (2d) 434,282 P. (2d) 905 (1955). See Barrett, "Exclusion of Evidence Obtained 
by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan," 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565 (1955). 
2 See Appendix, Table I, to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25 at 38 (1949), for listing of the sixteen states which then adhered to the exclusion-
ary rule for evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure. Since the Wolf decision 
three states have adopted the rule by legislation: North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) 
§§15-27; Texas, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941; Supp. 1956} art. 7'1:la; Rhode 
Island, R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 538, §16 [Acts and Resolves (1955) c. 3590]. Two states 
have adopted the rule by judicial decision: Delaware, Rickards v. State, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 
573, 77 A. (2d) 199 (1950); California, People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434, 282 P. (2d) 905 
(1955). In addition, Maryland observes the rule in the case of misdemeanors. Md. Code 
Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 35, §§5, 5a. 
3 U.S. CoNsr., Amend. IV. Similar provisions may be found in all state constitutions 
except that of New York. Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Un-
reasonable Searches and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REv. 11 (1925). 
4 People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435 (1922). See Grant, "Search and Seizure 
in California," 15 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 139 (1942). 
6 Shortly before the Cahan decision two extreme examples of misconduct by Cali-
fornia police in gathering evidence were brought to the attention of the United States 
Supreme Court in the cases of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conviction for 
possession of narcotics reversed where the evidence against defendant was obtained by 
"stomach pumping''), and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (use of evidence ob-
tained by surreptitiously placing microphone in defendant's bedroom was upheld, but the 
Court was severely critical of the employment of such means in gathering evidence). It is 
conceivable that a desire to overcome the stigma connected with these two cases affected 
the California court's deliberations in the Cahan case. 
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See Edwards, "Seasonable Protests 
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 37 MINN. L. REv. 188 (1953). 
7 People v. Berger, 44 Cal. (2d) 459, 282 P. (2d) 509 (1955). 
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is admissible.8 In California evidence so obtained is not necessarily 
admissible. 9 
The most radical departure of the new California doctrine 
from federal precedents, however, lies in the rejection of the 
requirement of "standing" which the federal courts have always 
imposed. In People v. Martin10 the California court announced 
its willingness to permit any criminal defendant to move for the 
exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure 
-regardless of whether it was his premises that were searched or his 
property that was seized. 
Rejection of the requirement of standing by this outstanding 
court calls for a re-evaluation of the requirement as it is imposed 
in every other jurisdiction that observes the exclusion principle. 
The analysis which follows will seek to accomplish this, first, by 
examining the standing requirement as it has been applied in fed-
eral practice; second, by inquiring into whether or not the require-
ment, as applied, is justified in the light of the theories and pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule; and third, by attempting to ascertain 
what effect, if any, the California doctrine will have upon the prac-
tice in other jurisdictions following the federal rule. 
I. The Requirement of Standing Under the Federal Rule 
From the very beginning, the lower federal courts have sought 
to limit the scope of the exclusionary principle adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States.11 One of the most effec-
tive means of cutting down the scope of the rule has been the 
"standing requirement." Of all the limiting rules, this has been 
called "the most devitalizing force."12 
A typical statement of the standing requirement is, "The 
guaranty of the Fourth Amendment ... is a personal right or 
privilege, that can only be availed of by the owner or claimant of 
the property subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. "13 In 
effect, this requirement imposes on one seeking to suppress evi-
dence under the Weeks doctrine the necessity of showing a definite 
8 See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. 56 (1950). 
9 People v. Brown, 45 Cal. (2d) 640, 290 P. (2d) 528 (1955); People v. Simon. 45 Cal. 
(2d) 645, 290 P. (2d) 531 (1955). 
10 45 Cal. (2d) 755, 290 P. (2d) 855 (1955). 
11232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
12 Grant, "Circumventing the Fourth Amendment," 14 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 359 (1941). 
13 Graham v. United States, (8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 740 at 742, cert. den. sub nom. 
O'Fallon v. United States, 274 U.S. 743 (1927). 
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interest-usually proprietary-in either the premises searched or 
the property seized, or both. The motion to suppress the evidence, 
which must ordinarily be made in a special proceeding before 
trial,14 must contain averments of the requisite interest. The ques-
tion of whether the requisite interest exists, however, is often 
a difficult one. The Supreme Court has never given an author-
itative answer, 15 nor has there been complete agreement among the 
lower federal courts as to the proper tests for determining the 
existence of the necessary interest. 
The "standing" requirement, as stated in the preceding para-
graph, looks to the Fourth Amendment as the ultimate test of 
"interest." As a matter of logic, it would seem that a person has 
adequate interest (or "standing") if he can show that the evidence 
in question was obtained by some violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The Fourth Amendment's protection extends to 
"persons, houses, papers, and effects .... " To be unconstitu-
tional, a search must invade at least one of these protected posses-
sions. "Houses," in this context, seems always to have been inter-
preted to mean "dwellings."16 Where the movant can show law-
ful occupancy of the illegally searched premises as a dwelling, and 
ownership of the articles seized therefrom, there is little doubt as 
to his standing to suppress the evidence.17 When something less 
than this is shown, however, as is nearly always the case in the 
reported decisions, the standing of the movant becomes doubtful. 
If, for instance, the petitioner is in lawful occupancy of the 
premises searched, but does not occupy it as a dwelling, then his 
constitutional rights have not been violated by the search. His 
standing to seek suppression of evidence obtained in the course 
of such a search must rest upon his ownership of the articles seized 
or on the fact that they were taken from his person. Thus in 
Occinto v. United States18 an illegal still was seized from 'the 
defendant's barn. Defendant's motion to suppress the use of the 
still in evidence was denied. Since the still was seized from his 
14 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The pre-trial motion is necessary to 
avoid the disrupting effect of having to decide at trial the collateral issue of whether or 
not the evidence was lawfully obtained. See Edwards, "Seasonable Protests Against Un-
reasonable Searches and Seizures," 37 MINN. L. REv. 188 (1953). 
15 See note 67 infra. 
16 See Nunes v. United States, (1st Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 905; Samson v. United States, 
(1st Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 769. But cf. Hobson v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 226 F. 
(2d) 890. 
17 But cf. Coon v. United States, (10th Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 164; Rossini v. United 
States, (8th Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 350. 
18 (8th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 351. 
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barn, defendant's dwelling was not violated by the search, and 
because defendant disclaimed ownership of the still, his rights 
were not violated by the seizure. Defendant, therefore, had no 
standing to raise the issues. 
If defendant can establish his lawful occupancy of the dwelling 
illegally searched, then he can move to suppress the articles seized 
as evidence, despite his disclaimer of any interest in the seized 
articles.19 Similarly, if defendant can establish his ownership of 
the property illegally seized from the dwelling of a third party, he 
can have that property suppressed as evidence despite his lack of 
interest in the premises searched.20 
The Fourth Amendment proscribes the unreasonable search 
of "persons" as well as houses. One might expect like rules of 
standing to be applied where a "person" has been searched as are 
followed when a "house" has been searched. Thus, where evi-
dence has been unlawfully seized from the person of the defendant, 
as, for example, in the course of an invalid arrest, the one whose 
person was thus violated should have standing to object to the 
use of such evidence without claiming ownership of the seized 
articles. In both cases a right of movant under the Fourth Amend-
ment has been violated, and logic would seem to require exclusion 
of the evidence in both instances. It is not clear that this is the 
law, however. There are strong dicta in support of the proposi-
tion, but no reported holdings.21 The cases that have actually 
decided this question support the view that exclusion of the evi-
dence will be denied unless the petitioner also claims ownership of 
the seized articles, or at least admits his possession of them. 22 This 
view is reinforced by the decisions in cases where an automobile 
has been stopped and searched without warrant and evidentiary 
articles seized therefrom. While the integrity of an automobile 
is not expressly secured by the Fourth Amendment, it seems never 
19 Hobson v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 890; State v. Scott, 41 Wyo. 
438, 286 P. 390 (1930). But cf. Lewis v. United States, (10th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 952: 
Scoggins v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 202 F. (2d) 211. 
20 Pielow v. United States, (9th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 492; United States v. Stappenback, 
(2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 955. But see Chicco v. United States, (4th Cir. 1922) 284 F. 
434; Ingram v. United States, (9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 966. Cf. United States v. Pete, 
(D.C. D.C. 1953) Ill F. Supp. 292, where embezzler was denied standing to object to 
seizure of embezzled property she had left with a third party. 
21 "Wyche was aggrieved [rule 41 (e)] because the search was of his person. He 
therefore had standing to object to its admission without asserting ownership of the 
property seized." Fahy, J. concurring in Wyche v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. 
(2d) 703 at 705. See also United States v. Fowler, (S.D. Cal. 1955) 17 F.R.D. 499. 
22 Lewis v. United States, (10th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 952; Harvey v. United States, 
(D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 928; Gaskins v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 47. 
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to have been questioned that an unreasonable search of an auto-
mobile is unconstitutional, and that evidence seized in the course 
of such a search is subject to exclusion under the Weeks doctrine.23 
The cases are not uniform on the point, but they tend to deny 
standing to suppress evidence seized from his automobile to one 
who does not also claim ownership of the articles seized.24 
In still another area the logic of the standing requirement 
seems to indicate a result contrary to that which probably would 
obtain in practice. Where evidentiary articles belonging to peti-
tioner are unlawfully seized from the person of a third party, peti-
tioner theoretically should be able to get the evidence suppressed. 
This, however, probably is not the law, if some dicta are to be 
taken at face value.25 
To suppress "papers and effects" wrongfully seized from some 
source other than the movant's dwelling or person, then, he must 
allege his ownership of the articles.26 This poses a dilemma for 
a defendant who is charged with possession of unlawful property 
-for example, an unlicensed still, gambling devices, narcotics, etc. 
-seized from him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. His 
motion to suppress the evidence will be denied unless he admits 
the facts essential to prove his guilt. But by making such an ad-
mission, the defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion under the Fifth Amendment. This aspect of the standing 
requirement rigorously limits whatever effectiveness the exclusion-
ary principle may have as a defender of Fourth Amendment rights. 
But such a result is not without a countervailing advantage, viz., 
it enhances the possibilities of bringing criminals to justice by 
removing a barrier which would othenvise prevent the production 
of all the facts pertaining to a defendant's guilt. This practice of 
forcing a defendant to waive either his right to exclude the evi-
dence or his privilege against self-incrimination has been criticized 
23 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924). 
24 United States v. Eversole, (7th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 766; Wilson v. United States, 
(10th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 754. But see Ellsworth v. State, (Okla. Cr. App. 1956) 295 P. 
(2d) 296. 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 481, where the court 
upheld the validity of the search by reason of the third party's consent, but expressed 
obiter the view that defendant could not object to a search of premises not occupied by 
him nor to a seizure of property not within his possession. 
26 It has sometimes been held that he must show both seizure from his person or 
dwelling and ownership of the articles. Coon v. United States, (10th Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 
164. See also Occinto v. United States, (8th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 351. 
1957] COMMENTS 573 
as unfair27 and even as unconstitutional.28 The federal courts, 
however, have countered this argument with plain language: 
". . . Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or 
in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure 
the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part. . . . 
If they come as victims, they must take on that role with enough 
detail to cast them without question. . . . They [are] obliged to 
choose one horn of the dilemma."29 The decisions indicate that the 
problem facing the defendant in these cases is insuperable. In 
one case, defendant, charged with unlawful possession of alcoholic 
liquor, tried to escape by admitting O\vnership of the seized bev-
erages while alleging that he did not know of the illegal alcoholic 
content. Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied 
and he was convicted on the strength of the evidence. On appeal, 
the court said, "As ... plaintiff in error voluntarily admitted all 
that the officers found ... , he could not have been substantially 
injured by the admission of such evidence."30 Another defendant, 
in a very recent case, tried a more direct approach. Charged with 
possession of illegal whiskey, she denied ownership of the premises 
and interest in the whiskey seized thereon. When her motion to 
suppress the whiskey as evidence was denied, she appealed, claim-
ing that the court's refusal to suppress the evidence unless she first 
waived her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination 
was denial of due process. But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit declined the invitation to override existing precedents.31 
In yet another respect the standing requirement serves to mini-
mize any value the exclusionary rule might have for a defendant 
charged with possession of illegal property. The concept of "pos-
session" employed in determining whether defendant has sufficient 
interest in the property to question the search and seizure differs 
from that used in establishing the fact of guilt. A defendant may 
not have sufficient possession of the property searched to challenge 
the admissibility of articles seized therefrom, but may still be 
guilty of unlawful possession. The question may arise where a 
27 97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 728 (1949). 
2s Edwards, "Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence,'' 47 N. W. L. REv. 
471 at 487 (1952), applies by analogy the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." This 
argument is without merit, however, if the exclusionary principle is not a constitutional 
requirement, as it probably is not. See p. 576 infra. 
29 Connolly v. Medalie (2d Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 629 at 630. 
30 Rossini v. United States, (8th Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 350 at 352. 
31 Lovette v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 263. 
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landlord occupies part of a building and leases part to third per-
sons. If an unreasonable search and seizure of the part occupied 
by the lessee uncovers contraband property, the landlord will be 
denied standing to object to the contraband as evidence against 
him in a criminal action for unlawful possession of the property, 
unless he admits ownership of the contraband.32 In one case, a 
defendant tried to avoid such a result by contending that if the 
court denied her standing to suppress the evidence because of her 
lack of interest therein, the question of illegal possession could not 
go to the jury for want of evidence. This contention was not ac-
cepted by the court.33 In another case defendant had left some 
clothes in a friend's apartment. A search was made of the friend's 
apartment, and morphine was found in some of the clothes defend-
ant had left there. Defendant, charged with possession of nar-
cotics, admitted ownership of the clothes, but denied any interest 
in the· morphine. It was held that he had no standing to object to 
the morphine as evidence since he disclaimed ownership of it, but 
his possession was sufficient to establish his guilt.34 
It is clear that the standing requirement, as it has been applied 
in the lower federal courts, severely limits the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule. Nevertheless, all the states except California which 
have adopted the exclusionary principle have accepted the rule 
with all its ramifications, inclu~ing the standing requirement.311 
California, on the other hand, has specifically renounced any bind-
ing effect that federal precedents might have on the development 
of the rule in that state.36 Unfettered by federal experience, the 
California Supreme Court has refused to apply the standing re-
quirement, which it considers to be a "needless refinement. "37 
IL Is the Standing Requirement Justifiable? 
A. The Theory of Exlusion. The standing requirement has 
been criticized as being illogical, unfair, and inconsistently ap-
82 Klein v. United States, (1st Cir. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 35; Rosenberg v. United States, 
(8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 179. See also Nunes v. United States, (1st Cir. 1928) 23 F. 
(2d) 905. 
33 Lovette v •. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 263. 
34 Ingram v. United States, (9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 966. 
35 For state decisions adopting the standing principle, see annotation in 50 A.L.R. 
(2d) 531 at 577-583 (1956), and the earlier annotations which it supplements. 
36 " ••• [T]his court is not bound by the decisions that have applied the federal rule, 
and if it appears that those decisions have developed needless refinements and distinctions, 
this court need not follow them." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434 at 450, 282 P. (2d) 
905 (1955). 
37 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. (2d) 755, 290 P. (2d) 855 (1955). 
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plied.38 Probably the strongest argument against the standing re-
quirement is the fact that it has remained after the theory which 
gave birth to it has been discarded. The early cases, following a 
dictum in Boyd v. United States,39 based the exclusion of evidence 
on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.40 
So long as this remained the theory of exclusion, there could be 
little doubt that only the person whose property had been seized 
could object to its use in evidence against him. This theory, how-
ever, was inadequate, for most of the cases involving unreasonable 
search and seizure could not logically be brought within the cus-
tomary concept of self-incrimination.41 In Weeks v. United 
States,42 the case establishing the exclusion rule, no mention was 
made of the Fifth Amendment. Ultimately, the Fifth Amendment 
interpretation of the exclusion principle became extinct.43 
Another early theory was that the exclusion of such evidence 
rested on the property right of the victim of an illegal search and 
seizure to have the seized articles returned. If this were the proper 
analysis, clearly no criticism could be made of a standing require-
ment. If the person seeking return of the property had no more 
title to it than the officers who seized it or the court to which it had 
been committed, then he had no right to have it returned. But 
this theory was never very strong. It did not account for the fact 
that not only the articles taken but also any evidence indirectly 
resulting from the illegal search and seizure could be suppressed 
as evidence.44 Moreover, illegally seized contraband, for which 
no right of return existed, could be suppressed as evidence.45 
A third theory regarded exclusion as a constitutional require-
as See Grant, "Circumventing the Fourth Amendment,'' 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1941); 
Edwards, "Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence," 47 N. W. L. REv. 471 
(1952); 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 55 (1955). 
39 " ••• [W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private 
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from com-
pelling him to be a witness against himself." 116 U.S. 616 at 633 (1886). 
40 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 
313 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
41 The Boyd case itself, from which this Fifth Amendment theory of exclusion was 
derived, presented a conventional self-incrimination situation. The defendant there was 
forced to take an active role in providing evidence against himself. The later cases lacked 
this element. 
42 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
43 See Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REV. II (1925); Grant, "Constitutional Basis of the Rule For-
bidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence," 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 60 (1941). 
44 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Cf. Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). See also 24 IND. L. J. 245 (1949). 
45 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (lottery tickets); Amos v. United States, 
255 U.S. 313 (1921) (liquor); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics). 
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ment integral to the Fourth Amendment itself. This theory has 
been widely accepted, despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment 
says nothing about exclusion of evidence. Cases decided by the 
Supreme Court before 1914-and favorably cited (though dis-
tinguished) in the Weeks case-had held that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require exclusion of evidence.46 The Weeks case, 
however, treated the question of exclusion as a constitutional issue 
without mentioning the Fifth Amendment, so a Fourth Amend-
ment interpretation is the only alternative. Under this theory a 
standing requirement is certainly no anomaly. The familiar con-
stitutional law doctrine of standing may be applied, thus permit-
ting only a party whose constitutional rights are alleged to have 
been violated to raise the issue of unreasonable search and seizure.47 
The "constitutional requirement" theory is not yet dead, but it 
probably is not the view currently held by a majority of the Su-
preme Court. The celebrated case of Wolf v. Colorado48 came very 
close to holding that " ... the federal exclusionary rule is not a 
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created 
rule of evidence which Congress might negate."40 The majority 
opinion expressly refused to make this ruling,50 but it is neverthe-
less probable that the quoted statement more accurately describes 
the consensus of the present Court than would any statement based 
on a constitutional interpretation.51 
While the Wolf case established that the federal exclusionary 
principle was not binding on the states, it also ruled that the pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure provided by the 
Fourth Amendment was enforceable against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Since the Fourth 
Amendment's provisions had previously been regarded as map-
46 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
, 47 See Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). See also 
Edwards, "Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence," 47 N.W. L. REv. 471 
(1952); Grant, "Circumventing the Fourth Amendment," 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1941). 
48 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
49 Id. at 39-40 (concurring opinion of Justice Black). 
50 Id. at 33. 
51 Of the three justices who dissented in the Wolf case, only Justice Douglas remains 
on the Court today. The probable views of the subsequently appointed justices can be 
estimated from the Court's opinions. Justice Warren concurred in the majority opinion 
in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), which ably expounded the "rule of evidence" 
theory of exclusion as opposed to the constitutional interpretation. Justice Clark, con-
curring separately in the same case, expressed dissatisfaction with Wolf v. Colorado, but 
nevertheless was willing to abide by that rule even in such a "hard case" as Irvine pre-
sented. Justice Harlan's dissent in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 at 218 (1956), ex-
presses a view that can hardly be squared with the concept of exclusion as a constitu• 
tional requirement. 
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plicable to the states, the Court invited the states who had previous-
ly rejected the exclusionary principle to " ... reconsider their evi-
dentiary rules"52 in the light of the Wolf decision. California's 
response to this suggestion is embodied in the Cahan case.53 The 
California court's decision was that the principle could not be 
defended as a constitutional requirement, but that as a judicially 
created rule of evidence it was quite proper. 
This decision raises the fundamental question. If it is conceded 
that the exclusionary principle is a rule of evidence only, should 
the federal and state courts which apply the rule follow the· lead of 
California in discarding the standing requirement as a "needless 
refinement"? Such a result does not seem to be called for by the 
mere fact that exclusion is no longer regarded as a constitutional 
requirement. 
B. Analogy to Other Evidentiary Rules. As a "rule of evi-
dence," the exclusionary principle must be viewed as a judge-made 
instrumentality for effectuating the policy of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The evidence is not excluded because of any lack of reliabil-
ity or probative value. Rather its exclusion is a means of indirectly 
effectuating a public policy that is wholly extrinsic to the primary 
function of the law of evidence. In this respect the federal ~x-
clusionary rule is not entirely in a class by itself, for this is the 
essence of traditional evidentiary privileges.54 
There are two basic types of rules relating to the admissibility 
of evidence, viz., rules designed to keep out evidence which does 
not positively further the objective of ascertaining the truth of 
the fact in question,55 and rules designed to exclude evidence for 
policy reasons despite its possible contribution to the objective of 
finding the truth.56 Exclusion of certain types of evidence is 
thought to have a beneficial effect in promoting some legal in-
terests other than the interests of the parties as such in the just 
settlement of the issues on trial.57 The purposes served by these 
li2 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 at 134 (1954). 
58 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955). 
li4See McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEX. L. R.Ev. 
447 (1938). Wigmore classifies the Weeks rule as a "rule of absolute exclusion" in the 
group of "rules of extrinsic policy," which group also includes the traditional "rules of 
privilege." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2184 (1940). 
55 E.g., the hearsay rule, the secondary evidence rule, the opinion rule, etc. 
li6 E.g., the privilege against self-incrimination, and the privileges extended to confi-
dential communications between husband and wife, attorney and client, physician and 
patient, etc. 
li7 See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §§72-73, pp. 151-153 (1954); McCormick, "The 
Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEX. L. R.Ev. 447 (1938). 
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two types of rules are often in conflict. The "rules of privilege"58 
compromise the interest of truth in favor of extrinsic considera-
tions. But the laws resists, if it does not prohibit, the sacrifice of 
truth to the demands of policy-supported expedients. Accordingly, 
the interest served by the privilege must itself be compromised. 
This is accomplished by means of the doctrine of waiver and by 
restricting the exercise of the privilege to certain persons and cer-
tain occasions. 
All evidentiary privileges, then, are subject to limitations. One 
such limitation is the rule that it may be asserted only by the one to 
whom the privilege "belongs."59 The right to rely on other evi-
dentiary rules accrues as an incident of being a party to litigation. 
But a rule of privilege may be asserted only by one who claims 
an extrinsic interest of the type the privilege is designed to pro-
tect. No abstract reason exists for limiting the exercise of rules 
of privilege to certain designated persons. It is the existence of the 
rule that serves the extrinsic policy, and not the application of the 
rule in particular cases. The policy behind the privilege would 
seem to be m_ore effectively promoted if anyone desiring to exclude 
"privileged" evidence were allowed to do so, but the courts have 
been unwilling to subvert the objective of ascertaining the truth 
to this extent. A person who does not have the requisite standing 
is not permitted to raise the privilege. The propriety of such a 
standing requirement has not been criticized, and it does not seem 
inappropriate to make a similar requirement in connection with 
the privilege to suppress evidence resulting from unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
If the. rule permitting the exclusion of evidence obtained by 
unreasonable search and seizure is to serve solely as a means of 
deterring overzealous law enforcement, and not as a means of 
remedying invasions of constitutional right, then admittedly the 
rights of the defendant in the property searched or seized have no 
bearing on the policy of the rule. It must also be recognized, how-
ever, that the fact that evidence against the accused was obtained 
by unreasonable search and seizure has no bearing on his guilt. 
58 The term "privilege" is used here in the sense McCormick advocates as proper. 
He classes as "rules of privilege" all those rules whereby evidence is excluded, despite 
its relevance and reliability, for reasons of extrinsic policy. McCormick was among the 
first to recognize that the federal exclusionary rule is most properly treated as an eviden-
tiary rule of privilege. McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 
TEX. L. REv. 447 at 450 (1938); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §74, pp. 153-154 (1954). 
59 McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEX. L. REv. 
IDu~~0~ . 
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The release of apparently guilty persons should be held to the 
absolute minimum deemed necessary to effectuate the deterrent 
policy of the exclusionary rule. If unreasonable searches and sei-
zures can be discouraged without excluding evidence in every 
instance, then some compromise of the exclusionary rule should 
be made with that other strong public policy which demands that 
law breakers be brought to justice. The problem of selecting the 
instances in which exclusion should not be permitted has been 
solved in the federal courts by restrictive rules such as the standing 
requirement.60 Similar means of selection are employed in the 
case of other evidentiary privileges, so a limiting rule which serves 
to reconcile, in part, this conflict of policies should not lightly be 
discarded as a "needless refinement." 
Completely apart from any idea of exclusion as a constitutional 
requirement, an inherent notion of fairness is violated when a 
man's domicile is unlawfully invaded and the fruits of that invasion 
are later used against him in a criminal proceeding. This is con-
trary to the idea that litigation is an honorable "sport," a concept 
that may be the real basis of the exclusionary principle.61 Where 
the defendant has suffered no ·wrong, however, but is merely seek-
ing to take advantage of a ·wrongful invasion of another's rights, 
our sympathies are not thus aroused. Fairness does not require 
that he be immunized from punishment merely because the 
rights of a third party have been violated. 62 
Whatever may be the distinctions which serve to separate the 
privilege to exclude evidence obtained by unreasonable search 
and seizure from the historic evidentiary privileges, in this respect 
at least they are properly analogous-some limitation is necessary 
to reconcile the conflicting policies. A limitation restricting the 
privilege to those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated seems to be a reasonable compromise. 
60 See Grant, "Circumventing the Fourth Amendment," 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1941). 
61 Wigmore makes frequent reference to this "noble sport" theory of litigation to 
explain the existence of certain rules pertaining to the exclusion of evidence, especially 
the rules of privilege. His tenor is half-facetious in his references to this theory, but it 
does not seem unlikely that some such idea may have had considerable, though un-
conscious, effect in the origin of some of these rules. This "noble sport," he says, has 
certain rules of fair play. "One of these is to give something of a start to the victim of 
the chase, to follow him by certain rules only, and to respect his feelings so far as may be. 
This complicates the sport, and adds zest for the pursuers by increasing the skill and 
art required by them for success. The expedient of convicting a man out of the mouth 
of his wife is (let us say) poor sport, and we shall not stoop to it." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §2228, p. 228 (1940). 
62 McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEX. L. REv. 
447 at 449 (1938); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §74, p. 154 (1954). 
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C. Federal Rule 41(e). There is another factor which will 
tend to keep the federal courts, at least, from following Cali-
fornia's example in discarding the standing requirement. The 
standing requirement has been codified in rule 41 (e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.63 That rule gives the privilege 
of return of property and suppression of its use as evidence to "a 
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure."64 The Ad-
visory Committee on Rules intended this rule as "a restatement 
of existing law and practice."65 It has been suggested that the term 
"person aggrieved" in the rule may include not only persons 
whose homes or property were searched or seized but all persons 
confronted with evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure.66 
One so confronted may indeed be "aggrieved" in a very real sense, 
but such a construction of the term clearly does not comport with 
"existing law and practice" as indicated by the decisions to date. 
It must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly decided that the standing requirement is an integral part 
of the federal exclusionary rule.67 Accordingly, it is not absolutely 
clear that the standing requirement will be upheld if and when its 
legality is ever squarely in issue. Indeed, one instance may be 
cited in which the Court apparently refused to apply the standing 
requirement in the strict manner with which the lower federal 
courts have applied it. In McDonald v. United States68 the Court 
reversed the conviction of a defendant when the motion of his co-
defendant for the return of property illegally seized from him 
had been erroneously denied. The Court said, " ... the denial of 
McDonald's motion was error that was prejudicial to Washington 
as well. . . . If the property had been returned to McDonald, it 
would not have been available for use at the trial." This case 
does cast a shadow of doubt on the validity of the federal standing 
requirement, since it is difficult to see how Washington could have 
been prejudiced by the admission of the evidence if he had no 
- right to exclude it. It seems probable, though, that the McDonald 
6318 U.S.C. (1952) c. 237, §3771, Rule 41 (e), p. 2547 .. 
G4Ibid. 
65 Id., Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision (e). 
66 97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 728 (1949). 
67 "While this court has never been called upon to decide the point, the federal 
courts in numerous cases, and with unanimity, have denied standing to one not the victim 
of an unconstitutional search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of 
that which was seized." Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 at 121 (1942). 
as 335 U.S. 451 at 456 (1948), noted in 97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 728 (1949). 
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case will be limited to its facts, 09 or at most that it will be regarded 
as authoritative only in cases where co-defendants are tried to-
gether. 70 
Conclusions 
In categorically rejecting the standing requirement, California 
has gone beyond all existing precedent. Even under the "rule of 
evidence" theory of exclusion, which California accepts, the stand-
ing requirement is not a "needless refinement." An analogous re-
striction is imposed on all evidentiary privileges, and serves to 
compromise the conflict between the extrinsic policy of the privi-
lege and the policy of ascertaining the truth at trial. In this in-
stance the extrinsic policy of deterring unreasonable searches and 
seizures probably can be effectuated without making the privilege 
of exclusion available to criminal defendants who claim no interest 
in the property searched or seized. The cases do not indicate that 
the abolition of the standing requirement of the federal rule would 
result in a decrease in unreasonable search and seizures by federal 
o_fficers. Perhaps California's rejection71 of the standing require-
ment is reasonable if the Rochin and Irvine cases are illustrative of 
law enforcement conditions in that state. It may be that, after the 
practices which gave rise to those cases have been curbed, California 
itself may reconsider its rejection of the standing requirement, 
and in so doing conclude that the exclusion of evidence at the be-
hest of any criminal defendant involves a sacrifice of the public 
interest too great in comparison to the public benefit secured 
thereby. In any event, no compelling reason appears which should 
lead other states to follow the California example. 
Robert C. Casad, S. Ed. 
09 See 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 728 (1949). 
70 But note the changes in the personnel of the Court since the McDonald case. 
71 See note 5 supra. 
